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Demand for more advanced Web applications is the driving force behind Web browser
evolution. Recent requirements for Rich Internet Applications, such as mashing-up data
and background processing, are emphasizing the need for building and executing Web
applications as a coordination of browser execution contexts. Since development of such
Web applications depends on cross-context communication, many browser primitives and
client-side frameworks have been developed to support this communication. In this paper
we present a systematization of cross-context communication systems for Web browsers.
Based on an analysis of previous research, requirements for modern Web applications
and existing systems, we extract a framework for classifying cross-context communica-
tion systems. Using the framework, we evaluate the current ecosystem of cross-context
communication and outline directions for future Web research and engineering.
Keywords: Web browsers, Web applications, browser execution contexts, cross-context
communication, mashups, systematization, classification, evaluation
1 Introduction
The evolution of the Web may be seen in the evolution of Web applications provided to sat-
isfy user demand [1]. Accordingly, Web browsers are rapidly evolving to support execution of
such applications. Where early Web applications were simple interlinked documents, recent
Web applications, known as Rich Internet Applications (RIA) [2], show an increase in func-
tionality, user-friendliness and responsiveness, and therefore in complexity. One recent trend
is seen in mashups [3, 4], Web application portletization [5], personal learning environments
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2 A Classification Framework for Web Browser Cross-Context Communication
[6] and complex widget-based applications, such as Geppeto [7], in which the client-side of
the Web application is designed and executed as a composition of semi-isolated Web browser
contexts, such as frames. This trend is emphasized even more with the recent introduction of
Web workers [8] through which browsers provide Web applications with GUI-less background
processing contexts similar to threads in operating systems. In essence, Web browsers are
evolving into environments for execution of Web applications [9], similar to operating systems
that execute multi-process and multi-threaded applications.
Development of modern Web applications therefore depends on Web browsers supporting
interaction between contexts, similar again to supporting inter-process communication in
operating systems. However, enabling cross-context communication has historically been a
difficult task due to the Same-origin security policy (SOP) [10] implemented in browsers. SOP
almost completely restricts Web applications executing in a browser from communicating with
entities on different trust domains, also called origins. As a consequence of implementing SOP,
for a long time Web browsers lacked native primitives both for same-origin and cross-origin
cross-context communication. Consequently, Web applications developers used and often
misused insecure browser primitives intended for other purposes, like browser cookies and
window location fields, to enable cross-context data transfer [11, 12, 13].
However, driven by industry demand for modern Web applications and browser compati-
bility, new primitives for cross-context and cross-origin communication are being standardized
and implemented as a part of the HTML5 group of standards [14]. At the same time, many
client-side frameworks are being built on top of both unstandardized and standardized prim-
itives, offering support for legacy browsers, cross-browser support and many other features
like security and high-level programming models. Today, Web researchers and engineers face
a complex ecosystem of cross-context communication systems in which it is often difficult
not only to discern each system’s capabilities and benefits over other systems, but also to
be aware about the issues affecting the operation and usage of such systems. Therefore, the
field of Web engineering [15], as “the application of systematic, disciplined and quantifiable
approaches to development, operation, and maintenance of Web-based applications”, should
provide better support for understanding and managing cross-context communication in Web
applications.
In this paper we present a systematization of the Web browser cross-context commu-
nication ecosystem. Our systematization provides both a broader and a deeper view of
cross-context communication through the following contributions. First, we analyze previous
research results related to this field. Second, we define a multi-dimension framework for clas-
sification of cross-context communication systems. Fourth, we consistently apply the defined
framework to existing cross-context communication systems. Although some browser primi-
tives and systems analyzed in our work have also been analyzed in previous research, these
previous analyses were not systematic and were mainly focused on security aspects. More-
over, our framework includes criteria that reflect cross-context communication requirements
of modern and next-generation Web applications, such as Web worker support, reliability,
discovery and high-level communication models. Lastly, we analyze the evaluation results
and give directions for future cross-context communication research and engineering practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic con-
cepts of cross-context communication in Web browsers. In Section 3 we give an overview of
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existing research related to cross-context communication. Section 4 presents our classifica-
tion framework and evaluation of existing cross-context communication systems. Section 5
discusses the presented framework and evaluation results, also proposing directions for future
work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Web Browser Contexts And Cross-Context Communication
In the context of the architecture of the WorldWideWeb [16], browsers are user-agents
which fetch and execute server resource representations, i.e. HTML documents and applica-
tions. Browsers manage the execution of each Web application using semi-isolated environ-
ments called browser execution contexts, sometimes also called script contexts [17, 18, 19].
Web applications may be built from many parts, each part executing in its own context. For
example, a mashup Web application [4] may contain a widget for displaying locations on a
map together with a widget for displaying Wikipedia information on specific locations, each
in its own context.
Each browser execution context contains an event loop which coordinates events, user
interaction, rendering and networking of the part of the Web application executing within
that context [14]. Most importantly, event loops coordinate the execution of JavaScript scripts
of the Web application. Since JavaScript is a single-threaded language with no concurrency
primitives, an event loop also executes in a single thread of execution. However, since the
execution of an event loop in one context is independent of the execution of other contexts,
event-loops of different contexts may execute concurrently. Furthermore, each context has
an associated origin derived from the URI from which the Web application part executing in
that context was retrieved. The origin [22] is a tuple consisting of the normalized scheme,
host and port parts of an URI, for example (“http”, “www.example.com”, “80”). Notably,
the origin does not include the path, query and fragment parts of an URI. The origin is an
important property of browser execution contexts as it was and still is the basis for designing
browser security policies, as explained later in this section.
Two types of browser execution contexts exist: window contexts and worker contexts. A
window context is an environment in which Web applications are presented to the user through
the use of a graphical user interface (GUI) [14]. Window contexts consist of a browsing
context that displays the user interface and an event loop that interprets JavaScript scripts
and manages GUI interaction and other events. Examples of window contexts are browser
windows and tabs, iframe objects and frames in a frameset [14]. In contrast, worker contexts,
introduced only recently with the Web Workers specification [8], consist only of an event loop
[8] and may be thus considered as GUI-less window contexts. Furthermore, worker contexts
must be associated with at least one parent window or worker context. According to the
number of parent contexts they may be associated with, worker contexts are further divided
into two classes: dedicated worker contexts and shared worker contexts. While dedicated
worker contexts are associated with only a single parent context, shared worker contexts may
be associated with multiple parent contexts.
Window contexts are created either directly by the browser as a result of the user request-
ing the execution of a Web application resource located at a specific URI or programmatically
from already executing window contexts. In contrast, worker contexts may be created only
programmatically from already existing contexts. Furthermore, browser execution contexts
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may create and nest other contexts which enable the parent and child context to maintain
a programmatic and sometimes visual relationship. Window contexts may nest both other
windows contexts, specifically frames and iframes, and worker contexts. Nesting of window
contexts enables composition of GUIs of multiple Web application parts on a single screen,
for example a portal page containing many widgets. In contrast, worker contexts may nest
only other worker contexts.
In essence, a Web browser is a platform which executes Web applications, where each Web
application is a set of browser execution contexts hierarchically organized into a tree starting
from a browser window or tab context. Figure 1 shows a simplified view of a Web browser
which executes two Web applications. Web application A consists of three window context;
the top-level window (c1) and two nested iframes (c3 and c4). Similarly, Web application B
consists of one window context and two hierarchically nested worker contexts; the top-level
window (c2) and two dedicated Web workers (c5 and c6).
Fig. 1. Simplified view of a Web browser executing two Web applications.
The correct operation of multi-context Web applications depends on the interaction be-
tween contexts. For example, widgets may need to exchange data for display on a GUI, as
shown for example in Figure 1 for communication between context c3 and c4, or a window
context may need to pass data to a worker context for background processing, as shown in
Figure 1 for communication between context c2 and c5. Therefore, systems are needed that
enable cross-context communication as a process of transferring data across browser context
boundaries. We define cross-context communication as any kind of data transfer between any
two context executing in any two browsers, which may be initiated programmatically. For
example, we do not consider user-driven copy-pasting or drag-and-dropping data from one
context to another [23] to be a cross-context communication process. Cross-context communi-
cation may be thus seen as a generalization and extension of inter-window communication and
inter-iframe communication, terms which have usually been used for denoting communication
between window contexts [20, 21].
Historically, the main problem with development of cross-context browser communication
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systems was related to security aspects of communication. Specifically, in order to prevent
many types of attacks on their users, Web browsers implement a security policy called the
Same-origin policy (SOP). The SOP policy [22] restricts scripts executing in browser con-
texts to communication only with contexts with the same origin and with server resources
with the same origin. In other words, cross-origin communication, as shown in Figure 1 for
communication between contexts c1 (origin o1) and c3 (origin o3), was denied by the browser,
while same-origin communication, as shown on Figure 1 for communication between contexts
c3 (origin o3) and c4 (origin o3) was allowed. Since most early Web applications were either
static or executed within a single context, they did not require cross-origin cross-context com-
munication capability and cross-context communication primitives were not being provided
by browsers or developed as external systems.
However, as Web applications evolved and their requirements for cross-context communi-
cation increased, developers started misusing other browser primitives to achieve even rudi-
mentary cross-origin cross-context communication. For example, browsers disregard the same-
origin policy for certain cases [10, 11, 18, 19] such as redirecting a window context to a new
URI and accessing the list of directly nested iframes of a window context [14]. Browser cookies
also have a different security policy which grants access based on the resource origin but ex-
cluding the scheme and port parts and including the path part [24, 25], which isn’t compatible
with SOP. Only recently with the development of the HTML5 specification [26, 14] have Web
browsers started implementing native and secure cross-origin cross-context communication
primitives. Consequently, security attributes of cross-context communication systems varied
from browser to browser and were the subject of extensive research, while other attributes
of communication were mostly unresearched. Still, modern Web applications require commu-
nication features which have not been systematically explored and analyzed, a problem we
address in this paper.
3 Related Work
In this section we give an overview of research that contributed to the analysis and system-
atization of cross-context communication systems. Most previous research activities were
focused on evaluating and comparing security properties of cross-context communication sys-
tems based on browser primitives not intended for cross-context communication. Other re-
search was focused on designing new browser primitives and client-side libraries that overcome
specific security deficiencies.
One of the earliest critiques of the lack of secure browser primitives for cross-context
communication was given by the proposal of the <module> HTML tag and API [26, 27].
Although it was never standardized or implemented, the proposal inspired research of the
later standardized HTML5 postMessage API [14]. A list of several similar early research
proposals is given in [28]. In [26] two techniques for communication between window contexts
are analyzed with respect to confidentiality and authenticity; fragment identifier messaging
(FIM) and higher-level protocols based on FIM, and the postMessage API.
In [29] the authors analyze whether existing and proposed browser mashup communication
primitives enable communication between two principals, browser contexts for example, with-
out ceding complete control to each other. Vulnerabilities of primitives are illustrated through
several proof-of-concept attacks and recommendations for prevention are given. Furthermore,
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an evaluation of design choices for access control aspects of communication primitives is given;
for example, using values versus objects for communication. In [30] the authors demonstrate
that the existing browser security model was not designed to support multi-context Web appli-
cations, and that as a consequence these are typically implemented insecurely. The paper also
emphasizes the need for higher-level communication abstractions and presents a secure com-
ponent model based on a publish-subscribe communication abstraction. In [31] a critique of
cross-context communication based on browser cookies is given with respect to security. The
paper also recognizes the security disadvantages of using server-side proxies for cross-context
communication. Furthermore, a proposal for a secure publish-subscribe communication sys-
tem is given. In [11] the authors analyze incoherencies in browser access control policies. A
special part of this analysis are browser resource types which may be shared among principals
and their interaction, which is a subset of cross-context communication systems.
In [20] the authors analyze inter-widget communication, a specific application of cross-
context communication, with the purpose of maximizing usability of widget-based personal
learning environments. The analysis is based on a framework for categorization of inter-
widget communication systems, an approach similar to the one we present later in this paper.
For example, the authors distinguish between same-browser and cross-browser communica-
tion, inter-widget and intra-widget communication, several types of event distribution, such
as broadcast and direct subscription, and several types of security and semantic interoper-
ability. However, the framework is strongly focused on end-user usability of inter-widget
communication and does not take into account many technical dimensions of cross-context
communication, such as discovery, cross-origin support and reliability.
The most recent and broad analysis of browser primitives for Web application interactivity
is given in [32]. The authors present results of a usage analysis of several new browser
primitives implemented in browsers as a part of the HTML5 group of standards. The results
show that the postMessage API, Web Storage API [33] and the Web SQL Database APIs [34]
are being used insecurely. Moreover, the authors give insights into why these primitives can
potentially be hard to use safely and propose the economy of liabilities principle in designing
security primitives - a primitive must minimize the liability that the user undertakes to ensure
application security. The authors also propose several enhancements to the postMessage API
to shift the burden of verifying and ensuring security properties from the developer to the
browser.
Another relevant field of research is secure architectures for modern Web browsers. In
this research field, the browser and management of Web applications are observed at a lower
level with regard to operating system integration and inter-process communication. Still, this
work is the foundation for implementing communication abstractions at the Web application
level. The security architecture of the open-source Chromium browser is described in [35].
In Chromium, the traditional monolithic architecture of browsers is replaced with an archi-
tecture based on two modules in separate protection domains: a browser kernel, interacting
with the operating system, and a rendering engine, executing with restricted privileges in a
sandbox. The authors describe the security advantages of the architecture and describe how
other architectures make it difficult to implement cross-context communication primitives.
The architecture of Gazelle, a secure Web browser constructed as a multi-principal operating
system, is presented in [25]. Gazelle’s security model protects principals, contexts from dif-
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ferent origins, by separating their resources into hardware-isolated protection domains. The
authors describe benefits of aligning the browser architecture with the SOP policy and analyze
cross-principal interaction possibilities.
Lastly, operating systems (OS) [36] have been extensively researched through the last
decades providing valuable experience for designing browsers as multi-context execution en-
vironments. Specifically, multi-process applications and inter-process communication mech-
anisms designed for OSes provide a starting point for cross-context browser communication
research. However, these mechanisms were seldom taken into account in previous cross-context
communication research.
In conclusion, cross-context communication is still an unresearched field and trailing be-
hind industry requirements. First, since SOP has been a major issue for the last several
years, research has been focused mainly on security aspects of cross-context communication
and disregarded other aspects. Second, since until recently only window contexts were in use,
no prior research includes worker contexts in their analyses. Third, many existing systems
for cross-context data exchange have similarly received little attention. Fourth, there is no
systematic approach aimed at analyzing cross-context communication or a broad systemati-
zation of existing systems. Fifth, existing operating systems IPC mechanism research has not
been integrated into cross-context communication research. Our systematization presented
in the next section addresses some of the stated challenges.
4 Systematization Of Cross-Context Browser Communication Systems
This section presents our systematization of cross-context browser communication systems.
The purpose of the systematization is three fold. First, we provide a framework for classifica-
tion of cross-context communication systems. The developed framework is a multidimensional
space in which each dimension represents one system characteristic and dimension values cor-
respond to alternatives for that characteristic. A specific system design corresponds to a point
in the design space [37]. Second, we clarify the current state of cross-context communication
systems by applying the presented framework to existing systems. Third, we propose future
research and engineering directions based on this evaluation of existing systems and future
Web application requirements.
Although the framework and evaluation of systems are presented separately, their research
and definition was interwoven. First we gathered existing systems and evaluated those us-
ing dimensions from existing body of research combined with existing engineering concepts
from IPC mechanisms from operating systems. Afterwards, we defined additional dimensions
in order to enable clearer understanding and comparison of systems. We iterated this pro-
cess until the set of dimensions covered most design choices of existing systems and possible
requirements of future systems.
4.1 Classification Framework
The classification framework consists of a set of dimensions relevant for research and evalu-
ation of cross-context communication systems. Each dimension is described separately with
rationale explaining its importance as an explicit system characteristic and possible alterna-
tives.
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Type of system – We differentiate four types of systems with regard to span of the
system’s implementation, as shown on Figure 2. The most basic systems are browser prim-
itives, i.e. mechanisms provided by the browser itself. Client-side frameworks are systems
that build their logic on top of browser primitives and don’t require any components out-
side the browser. These two types of systems are pure client-side systems as they do not
require any server-side components. However, the following two types of systems require
external components. A system that additionally requires calls to a server component but
only to coordinate communication is called a server-mediated coordination framework, while
a system that routes messages through a server component outside the browser is called a
server-mediated communication framework.
Fig. 2. Types of cross-context communication systems.
The significance of this dimension is twofold. First, as the span of the system’s implemen-
tation increases, the system’s run-time performance is expected to decrease due to increased
implementation complexity and network traffic. Furthermore, server-mediated coordination
and especially communication frameworks may suffer from scalability issues as the number
of communicating contexts increases. Second, the increase of the implementation span is
commonly correlated with the increase in system functionality; browser primitives offer basic
communication mechanisms while third-party frameworks build on top of them and offer ease
of use and other features. For example, because server-mediated communication frameworks
route messages outside the browser, these types of systems may also be used for communica-
tion between contexts executing in different browsers.
Window context support and worker context support – These two dimensions
reflects the system’s support for communication with window contexts and worker contexts,
respectively.
Cross-origin support – This dimension denotes the system’s degree of support for com-
munication between contexts with different origins. Other than systems that support only
same-origin cross-context communication and systems that support cross-origin cross-context
communication, a third type of system exists with regard to this dimension. These systems
support communication between contexts on the same domain and path. As more and more
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Web applications are built from context of different origins, this dimension determines the
gradual increase in applicability of systems, from those supporting only same-origin commu-
nication, to that supporting full cross-origin communication.
Cross-application support – This dimension reflects the system’s support for com-
munication between contexts of different Web applications. As we explain in Section 2, a
Web application is defined with the top-level window context of a Web browser, such as a
browser window or tab, together with all other window and worker contexts nested within that
top-level context. Therefore, cross-application cross-context communication systems support
communication between contexts nested within different top-level contexts.
This dimension is orthogonal to the Cross-origin support dimension because contexts in
different Web applications may have equal or different origins. Furthermore, this dimension is
also orthogonal to the Type of system dimension. Although server-mediated communication
frameworks usually do support communication between contexts of different browsers, this
behavior is not implied. Similarly, systems with cross-application support need not achieve
this support using server-mediated communication.
The significance of this dimension is in its relation not only to cross-browser communi-
cation, but also to communication between Web applications executing in the same browser.
Specifically, Web applications are increasingly built as to provide local APIs for their remote
services to other applications executing in the browser [38]. For example, consuming URL
shortening services provided by the URL shortening Web application which the user uses.
Communication model – One of the more important dimensions is the communication
programming model [36] which the observed system exposes to Web application develop-
ers. Message-oriented communication is based on contexts sending and receiving structured
messages. In shared memory systems, contexts communicate indirectly by reading from and
writing to a shared data space. In remote procedure call systems, communication is based on
contexts invoking procedures on remote context and receiving responses of invocations, as if
the procedures were implemented locally. In publish-subscribe systems, contexts communicate
indirectly by publishing messages to channels, named virtual entities, which route messages
to all subscribers subscribed to those channels.
The significance of this dimension is in its relation to ease of achieving application goals.
Application goals of different multi-context Web applications are significantly easier to im-
plement using a specific communication model versus using other models. Lower-level pro-
gramming models, like message-oriented and shared memory, commonly require a larger code
overhead to implement application goals than higher-level ones, such as remote procedure call
and publish-subscribe.
Naming – Contexts that want to communicate must have a way to refer to each other, a
fundamental function of naming. This dimension denotes the type of entity and its semantics
used to refer to communicating entities when using the observed system. In other words,
programmers using a cross-context communication system use these entities to refer to browser
execution contexts.
In most cross-context communication systems, contexts are referred to directly, using con-
text object references which are JavaScript references to browser contexts. These references
may be obtained in several ways; for example worker context references are obtained when
creating Web workers while window context references are usually obtained by special browser
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APIs for traversing context hierarchies. Some systems also support forms of indirect com-
munication where naming entities are not context object references. Some systems support
referring to window contexts using the document URI of the document executing in that
context. Other systems use custom string names, for example channel names in publish-
subscribe systems, or a combination of context object references and custom string names,
such as destination procedures in remote procedure call systems.
Discovery – This dimension denotes whether or not the observed system supports discov-
ery of communicating entities, implemented through discovery of entities used for naming. In
widget-based applications consisting of multiple widget contexts, widgets are often unaware
of each other i.e. whether a specific widget has even been loaded and if so, how to obtain a
reference to it. For example, the iGoogle portal generates random strings for widget iframes
names which complicates obtaining a reference to the wanted context manually.
Distribution scheme – This dimension denotes the kinds of distribution schemes sup-
ported by the observed system. The unicast scheme defines communication towards a single
context, the multicast scheme defines communication towards a defined set of contexts, and
the broadcast scheme defines communication towards all contexts in the application, except
the sender.
Maximum message length – This dimension denotes the limit in size of data sent
and received using the observed system. For message-oriented, publish-subscribe and remote
procedure call systems this denotes the maximum message size while for shared memory
systems this denotes the maximum size of a single shared memory location. The system is
unrestricted with respect to this dimension if it does not limit the size of data, while otherwise
it is restricted to a specific size (in kilobytes or megabytes), for example, restricted to 5kB.
However, browsers may additionally restrict message lengths of otherwise unrestricted systems
for security or reliability reasons; for example, to prevent memory depletion.
Transport system – Systems other than browser primitives are implemented using ex-
isting cross-context communication systems for data transfer. This dimension denotes the
names of other systems used to implement the observed system. As complex frameworks
commonly inherit properties of underlying systems, such as performance and browser sup-
port, knowledge of the underlying systems is an important instrument for determining the
suitability of a particular framework.
Reliability – Since browser contexts run in parallel and may be created dynamically by
scripts executing in other contexts, the destination context may not be ready for receiving
messages at the moment in which the source context is sending them. For example, in an
aggregator Web application with several widgets one widget may want to send a message to
another widget which has either not yet been created or not fully loaded. Therefore, some
messages may be unknowingly lost.
Therefore, communicating contexts need a mechanism to guarantee a certain degree of
reliable and fault-tolerant communication. This dimension denotes if the observed system
has such mechanisms or is otherwise considered unreliable. Some systems implement a retry
mechanism by which the sender retries the communication if no confirmation of success is re-
ceived. Other systems use a queuing mechanism that delays communication until the receiver
is available.
Communication confidentiality – This dimension denotes whether or not communi-
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cation performed using the observed system is confidential. In other words, communication
is confidential if no other contexts except the intended receivers may read the communicated
data. Otherwise, communication confidentiality is unsupported.
Communication integrity – This dimension denotes the degree to which the observed
system restricts unauthorized modification of communicated data. If the communicated data
may be modified without authorization and if no mechanisms are provided to receivers to
check if the data was modified, communication integrity is said to be unsupported by the
system. However, if mechanisms for verifying data integrity are provided by the system,
communication integrity is said to be verifiable. Lastly, if communicated data may not be
modified without authorization, communication integrity is said to be supported.
Authentication of sender and receiver – Authentication is the act of verifying a claim
of identity, which may be performed implicitly by the system or explicitly by the sender or
receiver. These two dimensions denote whether or not the observed system supports that
contexts sending or receiving data may not falsify their identity. In other words, if a con-
text sending data may falsify its identity, established through naming, then communication
does not support sender authentication. Similarly, if a context receiving data may falsify its
identity, established through naming, then communication does not support receiver authen-
tication.
Authorization of sender and receiver – These two dimensions denote whether or not
the observed system supports that contexts sending data specify intended receiver contexts
or that contexts receiving data may specify from which contexts data is to be accepted. The
specification of these properties is often expressed using authorization policies, which are of-
ten based on the concept of origins or even finer-grained with respect to context URIs. In
Web applications using cross-context communication systems without support for authoriza-
tion, contexts receiving data must implement application-level logic to support authorization
policies, if such support is even possible to implement. However, if supported, authorization
policies usually either specify a single authorized context or specify access control whitelists
for authorizing multiple contexts.
Generality of applicability – This dimension denotes the degree of applicability of the
observed system when developing Web applications. Most existing systems have been devel-
oped as generic frameworks and may be used for implementing cross-context communication
in any Web application. However, some systems are application specific and may be used only
in a subset of applications. For example, some systems may be used only for communication
between contexts that host Google Gadgets. Although limited in use as is, these systems
are still considered in this paper since they represent a substantial part of the cross-context
communication ecosystem.
Browser support – This dimension denotes the names and versions of major Web
browsers which support the observed system. Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Safari
and Opera are considered major Web browsers.
4.2 Evaluation of Existing Systems
In this section we present an evaluation of existing cross-context browser communication
systems according to the framework established in the previous section. However, as the
number of existing systems and the number of dimensions are both large, a full evaluation
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would require more space than permitted. Therefore, we restrict our evaluation to subsets of
existing systems and framework dimensions.
First, the evaluation does not include server-mediated communication frameworks. The
number of these systems is potentially very large since any kind of system for transferring
data on the Web is applicable. We address this issue further in the next section. For similar
reasons, the evaluation does not include various browser plugins and extensions, like Flash
[39] and Silverlight [40]. Furthermore, the evaluation does not include both numerous patents
published in this area [12, 41, 42, 43] and unimplemented research projects.
Second, systems are not evaluated according to several security-related dimensions, namely
communication confidentiality, communication integrity, and sender and receiver authentica-
tion, which have been addressed in previous research. Furthermore, the browser support
dimension was also left out due to lack of time for thorough testing of all evaluated systems
in all the major browsers on all major operating systems.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 presents the summary of the evaluation. In the following paragraphs, we
give short notes on the evaluated cross-context communication systems and give references
for more detail on each system.
The simplest system for communication between same-origin window contexts is direct
access [14] which enables the sender to access the memory space of the receiver, including
variables and functions, as if it was local to the sender. In order to achieve cross-origin commu-
nication, this primitive system was later replaced with manipulations of browser mechanisms
which ignore the cross-origin constraint. The fragment identifier messaging (FIM) system [13]
uses the location property of window context objects which contains the URI of the document
loaded in the context. The location property enables any sender to write but not to read the
fragment part of the receiver’s URI. Only the receiver context can read the URI fragment
data making the fragment identifier a simple form of shared-memory. However, the message
size of this system is limited by browser restrictions on URI length. A system similar to
FIM was developed using the window.name property of window objects [44]. Furthermore,
browser cookies, intended for session storage, were also used for implementing shared-memory
communication, however with a same-domain communication restriction [14, 24].
Due to low reliability, cross-browser support and sometimes inappropriate programming
models of these systems, new message-oriented frameworks were developed on top. The Cross-
Frame framework [45] is an extension of FIM while the complex window name framework [46]
is an extension of the window.name method. However, in order to enable a message-oriented
model, the frameworks use a server component to initiate communication. These systems
were accompanied by other frameworks based on browser-specific features enabling message-
oriented cross-origin communication, namely the RMR system [45] on WebKit based browsers
(Safari, Chrome), the NIX system [45] on Internet Explorer browsers and the FrameElement
system [45] on Gecko based browsers (Firefox).
The standardization of cross-context communication was addressed by the HTML5 spec-
ification. The specification defines two APIs for secure, reliable and message-oriented cross-
origin communication: the postMessage API [14] and the Channel messaging API [14]. As
most new versions of popular Web browsers implement these two APIs, they have become
the de facto standard for message-oriented cross-context communication. However, most Web
applications need to support older browsers that do not implement the new HTML5 APIs.
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Table 1. Evaluation of existing cross-context communication systems according to the Type
of system, Window context support, Worker context support, Cross-origin support and Cross-
application support dimensions. Legend: Type of system: browser = browser primitive, client
side = client side framework, server coord = server-mediated coordination framework, server
comm = server-mediated communication framework. Window context support, Worker context
support, Cross-application support: + = supported, - = unsupported.
Cross-context
communica-
tion system
Type of
system
Window
context
support
Worker
context
support
Cross-
origin
support
Cross-
application
support
Direct access browser + - same-origin -
FIM browser + - cross-origin -
Window name browser + - cross-origin -
Cookies browser + -
same
domain+path
+
CrossFrame server coord + - cross-origin -
Complex win-
dow name
server coord + - cross-origin -
RMR client side + - cross-origin -
NIX client side + - cross-origin -
Frame Element browser + - cross-origin -
postMessage browser + - cross-origin -
Channel messag-
ing
browser + + cross-origin -
XSS interface
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
Google Closure
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
jQuery postMes-
sage
client side + - cross-origin -
OMOS
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
Shindig rpc
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
easyXDM
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
Window post-
Messge plugin
client side + - cross-origin -
jsChannel client side + - cross-origin -
Web intents server coord + - cross-origin +
sMash server coord + - cross-origin -
Shindig pubsub
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
OpenAjax Hub
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
open-app
client side,
server coord
+ - cross-origin -
pmrpc client side + + cross-origin -
LocalStorage browser + - same-origin +
WebDatabase browser + + same-origin +
IdexedDB browser + + same-origin +
CrossDomain
Storage
server coord + - cross-origin -
WebWorker
postMessage
browser - + same-origin -
jQuery hive client side - + same-origin -
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Table 2. Evaluation of existing cross-context communication systems according to the Com-
munication model, Naming, Discovery, Distribution scheme and Maximum message length
dimensions. Legend: Communication model: msg = message-oriented, sh-mem = shared memory,
rpc = remote procedure call, pubsub = publish-subscribe. Naming: obj ref = context object
references, doc uri = document URI, custom str = custom string names. Discovery: + = sup-
ported, - = unsupported. Distribution scheme: 1:1 = unicast, 1:N = multicast, 1:all = broadcast.
Maximum message length: max = unrestricted, X KB/MB = restricted to X kilobytes/megabytes.
Cross-context
communica-
tion system
Communication
model
Naming Discovery
Distribution
scheme
Maximum
message
length
Direct access sh-mem, rpc ctx obj - 1:1 max
FIM sh-mem ctx obj - 1:1 2KB, max
Window name sh-mem ctx obj - 1:1 2MB, max
Cookies sh-mem string - 1:1, 1:N 4KB, max
CrossFrame msg ctx obj - 1:1 2KB, max
Complex win-
dow name
msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
RMR msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
NIX msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
Frame Element msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
postMessage msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
Channel messag-
ing
msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
XSS interface msg
doc URI,
string
- 1:1 max
Google Closure msg ctx obj, string - 1:1 max
jQuery postMes-
sage
msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
OMOS rpc string - 1:1 max
Shindig rpc msg, rpc string - 1:1 max
easyXDM msg, rpc, pubsub
doc URI,
string
-
1:1, 1:N,
1:all
max
Window post-
Messge plugin
rpc ctx obj, string - 1:1 max
jsChannel msg, rpc ctx obj, string - 1:1 max
Web intents msg, rpc string + 1:1 max
sMash pubsub string -
1:1, 1:N,
1:all
max
Shindig pubsub pubsub string -
1:1, 1:N,
1:all
max
OpenAjax Hub pubsub string -
1:1, 1:N,
1:all
max
open-app pubsub string -
1:1, 1:N,
1:all
max
pmrpc msg, rpc, pubsub ctx obj, string +
1:1, 1:N,
1:all
max
LocalStorage sh-mem string - 1:1, 1:N 5MB, max
WebDatabase sh-mem string - 1:1, 1:N 5MB, max
IdexedDB sh-mem string - 1:1, 1:N max
CrossDomain
Storage
sh-mem string - 1:1, 1:N 5MB, max
WebWorker
postMessage
msg ctx obj - 1:1 max
jQuery hive msg ctx obj, string - 1:1 max
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Table 3. Evaluation of existing cross-context communication systems according to the Transport
system, Reliability, Authorization of sender, Authorization of receiver and Generality of applica-
bility dimensions. Legend: Reliability: - = unreliable. Authorization of sender, Authorization
of receiver: - = unsupported, single = single authorized context, acl = access control whitelist.
Generality of applicability: generic = generic system, specific = application specific system.
Cross-context
communica-
tion system
Transport system Reliability
Author.
of
sender
Author.
of
receiver
Generality
of app.
Direct access - - - - generic
FIM - - - - generic
Window name - - - - generic
Cookies - - - - generic
CrossFrame FIM, direct access - - - generic
Complex win-
dow name
Window name - - - generic
RMR FIM - - - generic
NIX opener property - - - generic
Frame Element Direct access - - - generic
postMessage - - - single generic
Channel messag-
ing
- - - single generic
XSS interface CrossFrame, postMessage - single - generic
Google Closure
CrossFrame,
post-Message, Frame
Element, NIX, RMR
queueing - - generic
jQuery postMes-
sage
FIM, postMessage - single - generic
OMOS CrossFrame, postMessage - acl - generic
Shindig rpc
CrossFrame,
post-Message, Frame
Element, NIX, RMR
queueing - - specific
easyXDM
Complex window name,
FIM, NIX, post-Message
retries acl - generic
sMash CrossFrame - acl acl generic
jsChannel postMessage queueing single single generic
Window post-
Messge plugin
FIM, postMessage - - - generic
Web intents
postMessage, WebWorker
postMessage, LocalStorage
- - - generic
Shindig pubsub Shindig rpc queueing - - specific
OpenAjax Hub
NIX, CrossFrame,
postMessage
- - - generic
open-app Shindig pubsub queueing - - specific
pmrpc postMessage retries acl acl generic
LocalStorage - - - - generic
WebDatabase - - - - generic
IdexedDB - - - - generic
CrossDomain
Storage
postMessage, LocalStorage - acl - generic
WebWorker
postMessage
- - - - generic
jQuery hive WebWorker postMessage - - - generic
This motivated the development of many frameworks, like XSSinterface [50], the Google Clo-
sure library [49] and jQuery postMessage [51], that implemented the postMessage or similar
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message-oriented interface using either browser APIs or, as a fallback, previously described
message-oriented frameworks.
Furthermore, some Web applications require a different communication model to achieve
application goals. OMOS [52], the Shindig RPC feature [45], easyXDM [46], the window
postMessage plugin [53], jsChannel[54] and Web intents [38] are all frameworks that extend
the described message-oriented systems to provide a remote procedure call model. Similarly,
SMash [30], the Shindig pubsub feature [45], OpenAjax Hub [55], open-app [56] and pmrpc [57,
58] frameworks provide a publish-subscribe communication model. Many of these frameworks
are also based on the postMessage API and fall back to other systems for older browsers.
Among these systems, easyXDM, jsChannel, Web intents and pmrpc are the most recently
developed and have several advantages over other systems, such as providing reliability and
discovery features.
Along with HTML5, other specifications also introduced new APIs for storing data which
enable shared-memory cross-context communication in a standardized way. The LocalStor-
age API [33] provides a simple structure of key-value pairs, the Web SQL database API
[34] provides an offline SQL database, while the Indexed Database API [47] provides a com-
promise between the simplicity and speed provided by the previous two specifications. All
of the mentioned specifications support communication only between contexts on the same
origin and are not yet implemented by all major browsers. An extension of the Web Stor-
age specification to enable cross-origin communication is implemented in the Cross Domain
Storage framework [48] inspired by the XAuth protocol implementation [59]. The framework
is based on a combination of the Web Storage same-origin shared-memory and cross-origin
postMessage API.
Web Workers were introduced in recent years and therefore a small number of systems
support communication with worker contexts. The Web Worker specification [8] defines an
API, almost exact to the postMessage API, for message-oriented communication between
window contexts and directly nested worker contexts, and between two directly nested worker
contexts. The jQuery Hive plugin [60] reduces the code overhead of communicating with
worker contexts and is still based on a message-oriented communication model. Lastly, the
previously mentioned Web SQL database APIs and Indexed Database API specifications also
support worker contexts in addition to being accessible from window context.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss relevant aspects of the proposed framework and performed evalu-
ation. Based on the discussions, we give an aggregated view of the evaluated cross-context
communication ecosystem and propose several beneficial directions for future work.
First, both the framework and evaluation show that there are many relevant dimensions
to cross-context communication. However, we do not claim that the extracted dimensions
are completely orthogonal and therefore dependencies between dimensions may exist. For
example, a publish-subscribe communication model implies support for the multicast distri-
bution scheme and indirect naming. Although system evaluation and trend analysis would be
more succinct and clearer with orthogonal dimensions, we do not believe this is a significant
drawback.
However, we do propose that some dimensions be researched in more depth. The best
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example is the definition of server-mediated communication frameworks of the type of system
dimension. Server-mediated communication frameworks, as currently defined, include any
system that enables data exchange outside the browser. The importance of these types of
systems is in their support for communication between contexts executing in remote browsers.
As hinted by the currently developing peer-to-peer API in the HTML Device specification [61],
this type of communication is becoming more important. However, the difficulty in system-
atizing of this subset of cross-context communication systems is in that it includes not only
systems developed specifically for cross-context communication but also any kind of service
outside the browser which can be used for data transfer. This, for example, includes APIs
for accessing the file system, cloud services for publish-subscribe messaging, such as PubNub
and PusherApp, and even e-mail and social-networking services like Twitter. Therefore, our
future work includes a deeper analysis of these types of systems to provide a finer and more
useful granularity of values for the type of system dimension.
The proposed framework does not yet address the possible requirements of a cross-context
communication system with regard to creating contexts with which it supports communica-
tion. For example, the easyXDM framework may be used to communicate with a context
only if the framework was used to create the context. This feature enables easier setup of
multi-context Web applications but also limits the usage of the system in Web applications
not under the control of the developer, for example iGoogle.
Furthermore, the framework does not address performance-relevant aspects of cross-context
communication systems, such as the size of libraries which need to be downloaded by the Web
application using the system and communication latency. As these aspects are becoming more
important for modern Web applications and especially Web applications optimized for mobile
devices, research in this field should take them into consideration.
Some dimensions common in operating systems have been left out of the framework. For
example, inter-process communication systems are differentiated based on their synchronicity,
denoting whether send and receive primitives block execution until the other party responds
(synchronous) or do not block execution (asynchronous). Although synchronous cross-context
communication may be implemented in Web browsers, this is exceedingly impractical due to
the asynchronous event-based execution model of browsers. All evaluated systems are based on
asynchronous communication and therefore the dimension has been left out of the framework.
Furthermore, as noted in the previous section, a complete systematization of the ecosystem
should include an evaluation of all existing cross-context communication systems across all
dimensions. Therefore, future work in this area should include an evaluation of the left out
security and browser support dimensions, as well as evaluating representative server-mediated
communication frameworks.
The evaluation of existing systems gives the following insights and possible areas for future
work. As shown on Figure 3 a), a substantial number of systems use server components for
initiation of communication. Second, as shown on Figure 3 b), only a small number of systems
supports worker contexts and even a smaller number of systems unify both window and worker
context communication.
Third, as shown on Figure 4 a), only one third of evaluated systems support high-level
communication models like remote procedure call and publish-subscribe. These communica-
tion models are often preferable over message-oriented and shared memory models since they
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Fig. 3. Aggregated evaluation results for Type of system, Window context support and Worker
context support dimensions.
require a smaller code overhead for achieving application goals. Fourth, as shown on Fig-
ure 4 b), a small number of systems unify and expose more than one communication model.
As a result, several cross-context communication systems must often be used to achieve the
required cross-context interaction, thus increasing application-level complexity.
Fifth, as shown on Figure 5 a), although security features of cross-communication systems
have been the most researched, the authorization aspect of security is still significantly under-
developed. As concluded in [32], more expressive mechanisms for authorization, such as the
whitelist access control model, should be integral parts of these systems, for both senders and
receivers. Lastly, as shown on Figure 5 b), context discovery is addressed by only two of the
evaluated systems, while only seven of the evaluated systems support some form of reliable
communication.
6 Conclusion
Web browsers are evolving at a rapid pace to support execution of modern Rich Internet
Applications (RIAs). In many ways, modern Web browsers are offering the same execution
services as operating systems: application execution, reliability, security, resource manage-
ment and others. For example, the recently announced ChromeOS is an operating system
almost completely based on the Chrome Web browser.
Like multi-process desktop applications executing on operating systems, modern Web ap-
plications are built from many browser execution contexts. Examples of multi-context Web
applications include widget-based applications (personal learning environments) [7], back-
ground processing [8] and even platforms for secure authentication [59]. Therefore, a funda-
mental requirement for Web browsers is adequate support for cross-context communication,
a field which has historically been in disorder due to browser evolution.
Our systematization of cross-context communication is based on a classification frame-
work that establishes relevant properties of cross-context communication systems. We show
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Fig. 4. Aggregated evaluation results for Communication model dimension.
Fig. 5. Aggregated evaluation results for Authorization of sender, Authorization of receiver, Dis-
covery and Reliability dimensions.
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the usefulness of such a framework through a broad analysis of many existing cross-context
communication systems. The usefulness of the analysis is twofold. First, it enables a thought-
ful understanding of each system and comparison to other systems. Second, the analysis offers
insights into many areas for both future research and development of new cross-context com-
munication systems in order to support many new requirements of RIAs. As research results
concerning widget portals [62, 63, 6] and several cross-context communication systems [32]
suggest, we believe that future cross-context communication systems should be guided by the
principle of economy of liabilities [32]. In other words, cross-context communication systems
should hide the complexity of cross-context communication by providing high-level function-
alities, such as multiple communication models, context discovery, unified window context
and worker context communication and ease of specifying authorization policies. Further-
more, as high performance is an important requirement of Web applications, further research
should be focused in this direction. Consequently, we have started with the development of a
framework for testing run-time performance of cross-context communication systems. There-
fore, the next revision of our framework will at least include a dimension which reflects the
size of the cross-context communication system’s libraries required in the browser and the
empirically measured latency when transferring data between two contexts.
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